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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that the expansion of LGBT rights requires
engagement with the common practices of courtesy that confer and
reinforce social standing. In order to understand what this engagement
with good manners might look like, I outline the basic features of common
courtesy and illustrate how courtesy depends on a mix of utility, habit, and
pleasure. I argue that if the practice of courtesy is to be re-appropriated,
then all three of the factors that underwrite courtesy must be addressed. I
also consider the general possibilities for re-configuring courtesy. And, in
this vein, I suggest that the law may provide an important means by which
the re-appropriation of common courtesy can occur.

“Nothing, at first sight, seems less important than the external
formalities of human behavior, yet there is nothing to which men
attach more importance. They can get used to anything except
living in a society which does not share their manners.”
-Alexis de Tocqueville1

I. Introduction
In the final debate of the 2004 presidential election, the Democratic candidate
John Kerry was asked whether homosexuality was a choice. “We’re all God’s children,”
Kerry answered. “And I think if you were to talk to Dick Cheney’s daughter, who is a
lesbian, she would tell you that she’s being who she was. She’s being who she was born
as. I think that if you talk to anybody, it’s not a choice.”2 Following the debate, the Bush
campaign attacked Kerry’s answer as a “crass, below-the-belt” effort to alienate
conservative voters from the Bush-Cheney ticket by outing Mary Cheney as a
homosexual. Kerry dismissed the criticism and argued that he was simply “trying to say
something positive about the way strong families deal with the issue.” Elizabeth
Edwards, the wife of Kerry’s running mate, went further and suggested that the
Republicans’ criticism was an overreaction rooted in a “certain amount of shame with
respect to [Mary Cheney’s] sexual preference.”
For those interested in the future of LGBT rights in the United States, the
controversy over Kerry’s remarks is instructive – not because of the accusations of
homophobia and gay baiting that were slung back and forth, but because these
1
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accusations were exchanged over a question of good manners. Basic rules of campaign
etiquette in the United States generally place candidates’ children outside the bounds of
political debate.3 When a candidate’s children are mentioned at all, it is usually in a
positive, almost apolitical way. To breach this rule of campaign etiquette is to be
politically impolite, to convert an otherwise legitimate political disagreement into an
illegitimate personal attack by raising private issues that are not of public concern. The
Bush campaign claimed that Kerry had been politically impolite in precisely this way. In
their heated reactions to Kerry’s comments, Vice President Cheney and his wife, Lynne,
described themselves, respectively, as an “angry father” and as an “indignant mom,”
lashing out in response to a personal insult.4 The Kerry campaign did not deny that
campaign etiquette required the Democrats to draw a line between the rough-and-tumble
of political debate and candidates’ children. On the contrary, the Kerry campaign
claimed that this particular rule of campaign etiquette had been suspended by the political
use the Cheneys had previously made of their daughter’s sexual orientation. Mary
Cheney’s homosexuality was fair game for Kerry, Democratic vice-presidential candidate
John Edwards argued, because the Cheneys “had themselves brought it up.”
Ultimately, then, the controversy over Kerry’s remarks was about how issues of
sexual orientation are to be handled relative to the courtesies that govern political
discussion. In this instance, the rules of etiquette were invoked to head-off an open
debate about homosexuality and to focus attention instead on the issue of appropriate
candidate behavior. This example is instructive because it is not just an artifact of
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presidential elections. As Randall Kennedy has noted, the political efforts of
marginalized groups are frequently bound up with questions of courtesy.5 Codes of
courtesy typically mark-off and counter-pose the groups that comprise a given polity,
providing a means of reinforcing existing hierarchies across classes. Thus, in order to
win an equal standing in society, marginalized groups must often call into question
accepted standards of politeness.
We can see examples of this in many different areas of LGBT political action. In
their efforts to spur stronger governmental responses to the AIDS crisis, members of
ACT UP self-consciously contested the prevailing norms of courtesy that disparaged
public displays of anger and treated LGBT sexuality as an object of shame.6 Similarly, a
variety of activists have agitated against the U.S. military’s comprehensive “don’t ask,
don’t tell” code of etiquette that skews speech and action in a decidedly heterosexual
direction.7
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Randall Kennedy, “The Case Against Civility,” The American Prospect 9 (November
1, 1998 – December 1, 1998). Available at American Prospect Website. Visited
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Proponents of same-sex marriage have also found themselves bedeviled by
manners. To see this, consider that in addition to being a civil contract, a bundle of legal
rights, and (for many) a religious sacrament, marriage is also a particular social status.
Polite society attaches a special degree of respect and a distinctive set of expectations to
husbands and wives that is not extended to unmarried couples. The social standing of
married couples is related to the legal rights and religious beliefs associated with
marriage, but it is not dependent on the active exercise of rights or the genuine
embodiment of beliefs. A given married couple may not have been united in a religious
ceremony, may not visibly exercise conjugally conferred rights, and may even fail to
sustain a stable or peaceful relationship (a relatively common result reflected in the
country’s rates of divorce and domestic violence). Yet this married couple, like all
married couples, will nonetheless receive the courteous respect bestowed on those
individuals joined in matrimony. Marriage certainly provides a means of promoting
interests and a way of realizing religious ideals, but marriage is not valued solely (or even
principally) on these grounds. To borrow the words of Judith Shklar, one might say that
that marriage operates socially as “a certificate of full membership” and “its value
depends primarily on its capacity to confer a minimum of social dignity.”8
Although husbands and wives need not invoke particular rights nor achieve
religious ideals in order to enjoy special social standing, same-sex couples are denied
such standing whether or not their relationships actually make use of marriage-like rights
or live up to religious expectations. Same-sex couples are thus denied the basic social

8
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dignity that comes from the mere fact of being married.9 For many Americans the idea of
same-sex marriage seems to be a kind of rudeness, an inappropriate claim to social
standing that should be met with indignant disapproval. Voters in Ohio underscored this
point last November. They approved a ban on same-sex marriage that, among other
things, prohibited the state from recognizing same-sex relationships in any way intended
to approximate the “significance” of marriage.10 Even though the very first sentence of
the Ohio ban excluded same-sex couples from the legal definition of marriage, authors of
the ban wished to make sure that no alternative means of promoting the social standing of
same-sex relationships could be pursued.
The above examples suggest that, in addition to the repeal of restrictive laws and
the passage of favorable policies, the expansion of LGBT rights requires engagement
with the practices of courtesy that confer and reinforce social standing. What might this
process of engagement look like? It is tempting to call for a straightforward crusade
against an artificial and unjust hierarchy based on sexual orientation. But the engagement
must be more nuanced than that because courtesy is not simply a system of rules
manufactured to serve the interests of the powerful.
In this article, I outline the basic features of common courtesy and illustrate how
courtesy depends on a mix of utility, habit, and pleasure. I argue that if the practice of
courtesy is to be re-appropriated, then all three of the factors that underwrite courtesy
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must be addressed. I then consider the general possibilities for re-configuring courtesy.
In this vein, I suggest that the law may provide an important means by which the reappropriation of common courtesy can occur. More specifically, I argue that the law
depends on the same factors as common courtesy; thus, the law may be understood as an
alternative kind of politeness, a form of “legal courtesy” that offers a way of contesting
the claims and hierarchies of common courtesy. If I am right, then the law is an integral
part of the LGBT political project, not only for the vindication of rights-claims that the
courts may provide, but also for the kind of etiquette the law may help make possible,
giving reason to hope that in some future presidential debate the discussion of sexual
orientation will not be deemed impolite.

II. Common Courtesy
If questions of courtesy are at stake in the debate over LGBT rights, then it pays
to know something about how courtesy functions.
Courtesy is, as most writers acknowledge, artificial and open to hypocritical
exploitation.11 Courteous behavior may reflect genuine personal decency or it merely

11

The leading works here are by Norbert Elias: The History of Manners, Vol. 1 of The
Civilizing Process, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen, 1978, originally
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Society, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1983, originally published 1969).
See also Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1984); Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity:
Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987); and Jenny Davidson, Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness: Manners and
Morals from Locke to Austen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For very
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may reflect the desire to appear genuinely decent; the truly gracious soul and the
unrepentant rogue may both be unfailingly polite. It is therefore difficult to tell when
courtesy is actually meant and when it is just being faked. Judith Martin, the etiquette
maven and author of the syndicated “Miss Manners” column, points out that courtesy can
easily be used instrumentally and it often seems to be the case that “really mean people
get the advantage of practicing ingratiating behavior.”12
The artificiality of courtesy, coupled with the ever present possibility of
hypocrisy, would seem to be fatal flaws. How can such a practice persist? The short
answer is that courtesy does not survive in spite of artificiality and hypocrisy, but because
of artificiality and hypocrisy. These factors are essential to courtesy’s success because
people are often separated by sharply conflicting opinions and interests. To know
another person is not to love him. As Miss Manners puts it, to argue that people can get
along easily if they just get to know one another “trivializes intellectual, emotional, and
spiritual convictions by characterizing any difference between one person’s and another’s
as no more than a simple misunderstanding, easily resolved by frank exchanges or
orchestrated ‘encounters’.”13 It is the inauthenticity of courtesy – the insistence that
individuals conform to an artificial code of decent behavior whether or not they actually

useful “first-hand” accounts of courtesy, see Lord Chesterfield, Letters, ed. David
Roberts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and the following works by
Judith Martin (also known as Miss Manners): Common Courtesy: In Which Miss
Manners Solves the Problem that Baffled Mr. Jefferson (New York: Athenaeum, 1985)
and Miss Manners Rescues Civilization From Sexual Harassment, Frivolous Lawsuits,
Dissing, and Other Lapses of Civility (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996). For my take
on the subject, on which the current article draws, see Keith J. Bybee, “Legal Realism,
Common Courtesy, and Hypocrisy,” Law, Culture and the Humanities, 1(2005), pp.75102 and “The Polite Thing To Do,” forthcoming in The Future of Gay Rights in America,
H.N. Hirsch, ed. (New York: Routledge).
12
Martin, Rescues Civilization, p. 15.
13
Martin, Common Courtesy, p. 12.
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like or respect one another – that makes social peace and smooth interaction possible,
without unrealistically attempting to reconcile stubborn conflicts and without
romantically wishing away deep differences. Sincerity has far less promise of securing
social coordination. When people do not agree, any public policy that begins with a call
for honesty in human relations is likely to end with citizens shouting at each other in the
streets. Of course, within the ideal world of true intimates, where there is perfect
compatibility, politely hypocritical posturing would be destructive. But in actual society,
where there is mutual dependence and conflicting interests, hypocritical courtesies help
“false friends” make collectively useful arrangements without requiring deep agreement
or genuine affinity.14 Lord Chesterfield, the great eighteenth-century champion of
courtesy, identified this very dynamic in the early practice of politesse among European
aristocrats. Chesterfield argued that royal courts “are, unquestionably, the seats of
politeness and good-breeding; were they not so, they would be the seats of slaughter and
desolation. Those who now smile upon and embrace, would affront and stab each other,
if manners did not interpose; but ambition and avarice, the two prevailing passions at
courts, found dissimulation more effectual than violence; and dissimulation introduced
the habit of politeness.”15
None of this is to say that courtesy is neutral between all groups in society.
Norbert Elias has shown that civilized manners are inextricably tied to the development
of the modern state: in order to understand the finely calibrated, comprehensive controls
that constitute civilized conduct, the growth of state-centric chains of social
interdependence must be charted and the rise of state monopolies over taxation and
14
15

Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity, pp. 20-21.
Chesterfield, Letters, p. 144.
8

violence must be documented.16 Courtesy is not the handiwork of generic individuals
confronted with the general problem of coordinating their action; instead, it is the
consequence and hallmark of a particular political order. Therefore, it is inaccurate to
assume that courtesy necessarily facilitates accommodations among equals. Codes of
courtesy are by no means perfectly symmetric; on the contrary, they typically sustain
hierarchies across different classes of people.
The inequities of courtesy lead us back to the question of courtesy’s survival:
How does an admittedly artificial code of behavior persist when it is not only open to
hypocritical manipulation, but also selectively promoting the status of certain groups?
The utility-based answer that I gave when first confronted with courtesy’s artificialities
and hypocrisies has some weight here. One can acknowledge that effects of courtesy are
unequal across groups and yet maintain that courteous interactions are not without some
benefit for all parties involved. All sorts of false friends draw benefits from courtesy
even if they do not all benefit to the same degree.
But the argument from utility does not provide a complete answer to the question
of courtesy’s survival. If individuals valued courtesy solely because it helped enlist the
cooperation of others, then they would stop being courteous the moment a more
promising mode of behavior recommended itself – a realization that may happen sooner
rather than later given the role courtesy plays in shoring up existing hierarchies. Good
manners therefore cannot be merely a matter of self-control for the sake of selfadvancement. Individuals must feel some kind of normative attachment to being polite if
courtesy is to be widely and consistently observed.

16
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How can courtesy be normative? On one hand, it does seem true that, in spite of
all its thinness and artificiality, courtesy is not typically experienced as a mere modus
vivendi. There does appear to be a normative feel to courtesy, a sense that being polite is
the right thing to do. Yet, on the other hand, manners and morals would seem to be quite
distinct. Courtesy is disconnected from personal motive. Intentions matter a great deal in
morality, but they hardly matter at all in manners. A person performing a moral action
for the wrong reasons is considered to be immoral while a person acting courteously is
considered to be courteous regardless of her motives – and that is why courtesy is decried
for being hypocritical. If manners and moral are different, then how can the dictates of
etiquette be normative principles that are followed when they are convenient as well as
when they are not?
The answer is, in part, that the basic elements of courtesy are introduced to most
people when they are young. Courtesy achieves part of its “oughtness” through sheer
habit. Children are not usually persuaded to be polite; instead, they are habituated to
courteous behavior through a prolonged program of repetition enforced by the inflexible
say-so of parents. The continuous drill of courtesy lessons during childhood produces
adults who are disposed to follow the conventions of etiquette and who can be shamed
whenever they stray from the path of courtesy. Adults schooled in courtesy need not be
truly virtuous; they are committed to particular forms of conduct and need not actually
accept the substantive notions of concern and respect behind these forms. It may be, of
course, that the practice of polite conduct will occasionally encourage the development of
genuine virtue. It may be, as Miss Manners observes, that “if you write enough thank-

10

you letters, you may actually come to feel a flicker of gratitude.”17 But the habit of
courtesy is, at base, a habit of action and such habits cannot be lightly set aside. Courtesy
remains artificial, but the properly trained adult is nonetheless attached to courtesy as a
routine for negotiating social interaction.
The sense that one ought to be polite stems not only from habit, but also from the
gratification of desire. Courtesy provides an agreed-upon means for granting respect and
giving praise to truly deserving individuals, providing a way of satisfying the legitimate
desire to recognize and reward exemplary individuals. But courtesy also serves to gratify
the desires of the undeserving. Chesterfield made this point at some length. He linked
the courtesies employed in royal courts to the gratification of ambition and avarice, as I
have already noted. More generally, Chesterfield linked courtesy to the satisfaction of
self-love. A “mistaken self-love” is harmful, Chesterfield conceded, because it induces
individuals to “take the immediate and indiscriminate gratification of a passion, or
appetite, for real happiness.” Yet the sensible indulgence of self-love is the defining
characteristic of polite society. “If a man has a mind to be thought wiser, and a woman
handsomer, than they really are, their error is a comfortable one to themselves, and an
innocent one with regard to other people; and I would rather make them my friends by
indulging them in it, than my enemies by endeavoring (and that to no purpose) to
undeceive them.” It is no use lamenting that self-love drives people to place so much
stock in such shallow talk, for the “world is taken by the outside of things, and we must
take the world as it is; you or I cannot set it right.” Besides, the way of the world makes

17

Martin, Common Courtesy, p. 11-12. For an extended meditation on the possibility of
becoming what one pretends to be, see William Ian Miller, Faking It (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11

the pleasures of politeness available to everyone. The reciprocal practice of courtesy
allows all to appease the vanities of each, binding the heart of every individual in polite
society to the conventions of good manners. Thus, it is not only useful to be polite, but it
also positively feels like the right thing to do. “Pleasing in company,” Chesterfield noted,
“is the only way of being pleased in it yourself.”18

III. Possibilities for Change
According to the foregoing sketch, common courtesy is at once artificial, open to
hypocritical manipulation, rooted in habit, sustained by self-love, tied to hierarchy, and
essential for securing social coordination in contexts of diversity and disagreement. This
complex picture of courtesy contains some promising signs for those whom wish to alter
polite society. First, the artificiality of manners suggests that codes of courtesy can be
drawn up in any number of ways. In principle, there is no reason why the pleasures of
politeness cannot be derived from many different schemes of etiquette (though the
gratification of vanity will undoubtedly be higher for specific individuals in a system that
clearly privileges small elites). Same-sex couples may currently be denied social
standing in polite society, but this need not be a permanent condition.
Second, the potential for hypocrisy built into the basic structure of courtesy
indicates that change may occur without fundamentally altering individual beliefs. Public

18

Chesterfield, Letters, pp. 90, 61, 185, 88. Chesterfield traced his outlook to La
Rochefoucauld, but antecedents can also be found in the writings of Machiavelli and of
Guicciardini. See Francesco Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi), trans.
Mario Domandi (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965). For a discussion
of Machiavelli along these lines, see Grant, Hypocrisy, pp. 18-56.
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opinion polls from the past twenty-five years indicate that a majority of Americans
consider homosexuality to be morally wrong.19 Yet the average American need not be
genuinely convinced that every sexual orientation is deserving of equal treatment in order
for new codes of courtesy to be introduced. After all, intentions are not central to the
practice of courtesy. Politeness is as politeness does. Common courtesy will change
when Americans, for whatever reason, learn to act as if the committed relationships of
heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals deserve the same measure of respect, just as they
currently act as if all husbands and wives deserve respect. A revolution in manners will
not necessarily erase the underlying differences in belief and identity that divide us, but it
will substantially re-structure the way in which those differences are managed.
If my portrait of courtesy contains signs of hope, it also gives reason to doubt that
change will be either easy or swift. The artificiality of manners means that particular
requirements of courtesy cannot be invalidated simply by pointing out that these
requirements are contrived and inconsistent with the facts of contemporary life. Thus,
even though it is true that the prevailing polite view of marriage is belied by the high
rates of domestic violence and divorce in the United States, this does not mean that the
polite view of marriage is loosely held. The general utility of artificial rules, coupled
with the force of habit and the pleasures of politeness, make established manners difficult
to dislodge. Well-mannered individuals may easily dismiss new patterns of behavior as
examples of rudeness and simply continue drumming the status quo rudiments of good
behavior into their children.
19

Gregory B. Lewis, “Contentious and Consensus Gay Rights Issues: Public Opinion
and State Laws on Non-discrimination and Same-sex Marriage,” paper presented to the
Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, December 2,
2004.
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The resistance to change is compounded by courtesy’s decentralization. There is
no central agency or institution that controls the terms of politeness. One might argue
this lack of institutional centralization confers distinct advantages, allowing the rules of
etiquette to be easily and continuously applied in a wide variety of settings without
cumbersome procedures or expense. But the lack of centralization also makes common
courtesy an unwieldy and seemingly ungovernable system. Consider the plight of Miss
Manners. Although she insists that manners are necessary for life in common, she also
finds the form of manners practiced by many Americans to be unacceptable. In her view,
too many people choose either to adhere to the retrograde courtesy codes of a bygone era
or to invent their own personal “style” of politeness. Miss Manners laments the existence
of such errant courtesies, but there is really little that she can do about them.20 Without a
central entity capable of enforcing good manners, the development of courtesy may
easily frustrate those whom wish to change its course.

IV. Legal Courtesy
In spite of such barriers, it is nonetheless true that American manners have been
purposefully altered. Jim Crow segregation was surrounded and sustained by wellestablished rules of racial etiquette. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, among
other things, engaged in a series of “rude” actions like lunch-counter sit-ins that
contravened the prevailing etiquette and initiated a transition toward a less hierarchical

20

This is not to say that Miss Manners is entirely helpless. She can (and does) criticize
boorish behavior – a tactic that she considers effective because her own “look of
disapproval has been known to sizzle bacon” (Martin, Rescues Civilization, p. 32).
14

form of civility between the races. The transformation in racial etiquette is arguably
incomplete, but a shift has undeniably occurred and, in this regard, the Civil Rights
Movement must be judged a success. For those involved in a crusade to change courtesy,
what lessons does the experience of the Civil Rights Movement hold?21
Law was central to the success of the Civil Rights Movement. Path-breaking
legislation and landmark judicial decisions invalidated racially discriminatory practices
that excluded African Americans from important political and civic arenas. Moreover,
and more importantly for my purposes here, the law granted African Americans new
standing. Judges developed a new set of legal doctrines under the Equal Protection
Clause that gave African Americans a special status in legal reasoning (a status that was
later generalized to all groups classified by race). By the end of the 1960s, the courts had
made it clear that any legal arguments assigning an individual a different standing on the
basis of race would be subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny. Relegated to a
subordinate position in polite society, African Americans found their equal status
recognized and confirmed in the world of law.
African Americans ultimately used the shift in legal status to leverage a shift in
social status. On might argue that this leveraging was a direct result of the courts’
enforcement powers. After all, judicial orders are backed by state force and victories
won in court can be directly imposed on society. But this explanation is too simple.

21

The claim that the current struggle for LGBT rights is analogous to the Civil Rights
Movement is, of course, a contentious one denied by opponents of same-sex marriage.
See Pinello, “Oregon’s Struggle.”
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First, it overestimates the judiciary’s reserves of independent power.22 Second, it
underestimates the difficulty of altering common courtesy – a practice that is, as I
suggested above, quite resistant to change for a number of reasons.
The better explanation, I would argue, is that African Americans were able to
leverage new forms of legal treatment into new forms of polite treatment because both
law and courtesy operate on essentially the same terms of habit, pleasure, and utility. The
key difference is that law has a centralized institutional structure, a structure that allows
alterations in legal reasoning to be propagated throughout the legal system in an agreedupon manner. Thus, once a change in legal reasoning has been consolidated, the law may
be invoked to influence common courtesy, placing consistent pressure on the habits,
pleasures, and utilitarian accommodations on which good manners depend. Rather than
relying on a few self-appointed authorities to shame individuals into adopting a new kind
of etiquette (the Miss Manners model), the legal system slowly erodes old courtesies
throughout the entire society as new laws are enforced and the courts process disputes.23
My reference to changes in racial etiquette is meant to be suggestive. My aim
here is not to provide the empirical support necessary to sustain a particular account of
how racial courtesies have developed in the United States (a task that is beyond the scope

22

Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
23
Miss Manners herself recognizes the powerful influence the legal system may have on
manners and she openly deplores it. In her view, to allow law to influence manners is to
favor the expensive, punitive practice of litigation over the gentle, voluntary methods of
politeness. There may be some truth to her claim, but in focusing on the risk of
increasing litigiousness, she overlooks the progressive influence that law has had on
courtesy. Many of the boorish behaviors that Miss Manners has decried (including
various forms of sexist and racist exclusion) are on their way out because of changes in
law.
16

of this article), but to suggest that legal reasoning itself may operate like a from of
politeness and, as such, may be useful to groups contesting the ways in which common
courtesy confers social standing.
In what sense, then, can legal reasoning be said to be a form of politeness? That
is, if one were to project a vision of the legal process based on the rendering of courtesy I
have given, what might one see? At the most general level, one would see legal
reasoning presented as a method of handling endemic political conflicts. Disputes would
not be resolved, but only more or less successfully managed. Moreover, for such dispute
management to occur, it would not be necessary for individuals to check their political
commitments at the courthouse door nor would it be necessary to call political partisans
before a judge so that they could be joyfully reconciled. Without requiring political
conflict to be sequestered or transformed, law would work as a means of dispute
management so long as all parties continued to argue in legal terms. Law, like courtesy,
would be an artificial medium in which otherwise opposed parties could jointly find a
means of moving on. From this perspective, the possibility of hypocrisy (defined as the
opportunity to put distance between the political roots of a conflict and the conflict’s
courtroom rendering) would not be an aberration in legal reasoning so much as a basic
condition of its operation. Everyone, including the judge, would be given the chance to
be insincere in order to produce mutually useful arrangements. Indeed, it would be
because legal actors are not always required to mean what they say that the legal system
would effectively processes conflict and disagreement.24

24

It is worth emphasizing that in saying law and courtesy are open to hypocrisy I am not
saying these two systems are only used by hypocrites (in the case of courtesy, I have
already noted that politeness may be the authentic expression of a gracious nature, and
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If the analogy from courtesy is valid, then one would expect several conditions to
obtain. First, one would expect that legal actors would actually attempt to accommodate
conflicting interests in a “courteously thin” fashion. The courtesy analogy envisions
legal actors whom seek ways of handling litigant interests without necessarily altering –
or even addressing – the fundamental conflicts that gave rise to dispute. Thus, rather
than emphasizing the conceptual depth or logical rigor of judicial decisions, the courtesy
analogy leads one to expect that judicial decisions need only be thin. Second, if the
courtesy analogy is valid, one would expect ordinary citizens to accept the courteously
thin decisions that the law offers. After all, for courtesy to be common, it must be shared
by all parties. Third, one would expect habit and pleasure to play key roles in the legal
process. If law is like courtesy, then the normative attachment that individuals have to
law should be rooted in routinized behavior and the gratification of desire. Fourth, one
would expect law to sustain inequalities across social groups. Changes in law may level
selected hierarchies, but, if legal reasoning is like courtesy, then the accommodations
provided by law will always be asymmetric in some fashion (even though the
accommodations will also be of some benefit to all).25 Courteous legal settlements
should tend to promote certain claims and classes above others.

that the existence of an agreed-upon code of courtesy provides a ready means for granting
respect and giving praise to truly deserving individuals). My point is not to deny that
either courtesy or law are important for people of goodwill and sincere virtue, but rather
to argue (i) that this is not the only set of people for whom such systems important; and
(ii) that the overall operation of courtesy and law cannot be understood if we think of
them simply as the ways genuinely nice people treat one another.
25
Indeed, scholars have argued that in the case of African Americans the gains in legal
standing have not translated into completely equal treatment. See Alan Freeman, Alan D.
Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-discrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, Minnesota Law Review 62 (1978).
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In my view, all the expectations suggested by the courtesy analogy are plausible
and empirically supported. Let me begin with the expectation that legal actors will
accommodate conflicting interests and do so courteously. It is clear that many American
legal actors positively value courtesy. Since the late 1980s, “civility codes” have been
developed and formally adopted by at least forty-one separate bar associations, including
the American Bar Association, and by nine different courts, including the Supreme
Courts of Utah and Wisconsin, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.26 The practice
of legal civility has been actively promoted by the American Inns of Courts, a national
legal association with 325 chapters and over 75,000 active and alumni members.27 The
importance of legal civility has also been publicly endorsed by two of the justices
currently sitting on the United States Supreme Court.28 Indeed, evidence indicates not
only that many legal actors positively value courtesy, but also that courts actually manage
26

My tally undoubtedly undercounts the number of civility codes. To my knowledge,
the most comprehensive list of professional codes for lawyers and judges is maintained
by the American Bar Association (ABA Website. Visited February 18, 2005.
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/profcodes.html>). The ABA list is incomplete. It does not
include, for example, the civility code adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 2003 (Utah
State Courts Website. Visited February 18, 2005.
<http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/civility.htm>); the civility code adopted by the
Boston Bar Association in 1997 (see Cathleen Cavell, “Please Please Me: Voluntary
Civility Standards for Lawyers.” Massachusetts Government Website. Visited February
18, 2005. <http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/please.htm>); and the civility code adopted by
a federal district court in Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan Ass’n,
121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D.Tex.1988) – see Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, “Interim Report,” April 1991, reprinted in 143 F.R.D. 371, 414-15.
Moreover, I have compiled the bulk of my tally from the ABA list by examining the
titles of the professional codes. It is likely that many bar associations and courts with
civility codes have appended these codes to existing standards of professional conduct
that do not themselves mention “civility” or “courtesy” in their titles.
27
<http://www.innsofcourt.org/> Visited February 18, 2005.
28
See Paul L. Friedman, “Taking the High Road: Civility, Judicial Independence, and
the Rule of Law,” New York University Annual Survey of Law 58 (2001), pp.187-202;
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Speaking in a Judicial Voice,” New York University Law Review
67 (1992).
19

to arrive at courteously thin accommodations much of the time. Scholars have found that
American judges often produce fragmented and incomplete decisions rather than
sweeping statements of principle. Instead of being models of well-specified justification,
judicial opinions often appear to be piecemeal, ramshackle affairs cobbled together to
dispose of the case at hand. The ambiguities and inconsistencies of such opinions mean
that the bulk of any given dispute often goes unaddressed. Thus, in many instances, the
key judicial decision is to leave matters undecided. Cass Sunstein, the leading scholar in
this area, argues that such “minimalist” judicial decisions serve the “great goal” of a free
society: to make agreement possible when agreement is necessary, and to make
agreement unnecessary when it is impossible.29 In view of my account of courtesy, one
might simply say that these decisions are “polite.”
Do ordinary citizens find courteous legal action acceptable? Evidence suggests
that they often do. The ambiguous, incomplete judicial opinion itself invites litigant
compliance.30 By failing to articulate the entire principled basis of a decision or by
offering a compromise ruling, a judge can simultaneously recognize the conflicting
claims of both litigants, even as she ultimately rules in favor of one party over the other.
No one is likely to be entirely satisfied with the result and, considered as devices for
securing deep consensus or as exercises in principled logic, ambiguous judicial decisions
are rightly deemed failures. Yet, by leaving many dimensions of the dispute open and the
principled underpinning of the opinion under-developed, ambiguous decisions reward
victorious litigants with less than they might have won and divest defeated litigants of
29

Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 50. See also Edward Levi, An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
30
Shapiro, Courts; Sunstein, One Case.
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less than they might have lost. Both winner and loser might have done better, but they
also could have done worse. Moreover, both winner and loser are left with a flexible
legal framework that over time can be invoked to meet different demands and adapted to
address developing disputes.
Independent of the attractions found in ambiguous judicial decisions, citizens may
be satisfied simply when the legal process treats them with courtesy and respect.31

In

part, individuals weigh the quality of treatment heavily because popular culture has
habituated them to basic ideas of decency and fairness. People carry their ideas of decent
treatment into court and expect their ideas to be confirmed, even if the judge’s ultimate
decision is not their favor. The quality of treatment also matters for reasons of pleasure.
To be treated with courtesy and respect by a court is to be given the gratification of being
recognized as a rights-bearing individual with equal standing in the community of
citizens. Citizens often care less about controlling the judicial process than about how
that process goes about assigning and confirming their status.
The acceptance of courteous accommodations is also cemented by the habit of
legal thinking common among Americans. Our public discourse is permeated with legal
talk and judicial decisions. As Tocqueville noted over 150 years ago, “there is hardly a
political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial
one.”32 His observation still rings true.33 Americans are habituated by mass culture and

31

Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990);
Tom R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with
the Police and Courts (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). Individuals weigh
the quality of treatment most heavily when evaluating their direct experiences in court,
but the quality of treatment also informs more general evaluations of court performance
(Tyler and Huo, Trust in Law, pp.177-97).
32
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p.270.
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by political practice to “think like a lawyer” and, thus, find it natural to re-frame issues in
terms of legal argument.
For all its utility, does law, like courtesy, sustain social hierarchies? There is
good reason to think so. First, there is no guarantee that the habits or desires on which
the law depends are geared to serve collective interests in an evenhanded way. Many
Americans may “think like a lawyer,” but it is questionable whether a habitual reliance
on legal terms provides the most fruitful way of framing problems and formulating
policies.34 Similarly, many Americans may be gratified by having their day in court, but
it is debatable whether the desire to experience the supposed “majesty of the law”
promotes an egalitarian relationship to the legal process.35 Beyond the issues of habit and
pleasure, the evidence suggests that the legal process manages disputes in a way that
protects and sustains prevailing distributions of power. The civility codes that have been
instituted around the country, for example, have been explicitly deployed as defensive
measures against a growing number of lawyers and judges with new interests contrary to
the time honored values of the profession.36 The problem is not that the judicial process

33

Robert N. Bellah, William Sullivan, Ann Swindler, and Steven Tipton, Habits of the
Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985); Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law:
Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
34
Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1977); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work:
Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994).
35
Ewick and Silbey, Common Place. The fact that courtesy may be collectively
problematic does not mean that it is not beneficial for select groups. Indeed, as Elias
notes (Court Society, pp.78-104), etiquette may become preposterously burdensome and
still serve the interests of ruling elites.
36
In the case of lawyers, the perceived new interest is in winning at all costs and making
as much money as possible; in the case of judges, the perceived new interest is in making
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literally could not be run on the basis of these new interests, but that a judicial process so
constituted would allocate institutional resources differently and would no longer be
“civil.”37 Legal courtesy promises to lift judges, lawyers, and citizens above the fray of
contending interests in order to make available new opportunities for dispute
management. But, as with common courtesy, legal courtesy is not neutral; it is organized
around a specific order and dedicated to keeping people in their proper place. Although
the specific mechanism is somewhat different, the end result is one that has been
confirmed by three decades of sociolegal scholarship: the individualized processing of
discrete legal conflicts yields systematically skewed results.38

one’s personal views prevail in written opinions (thus it is not the proliferation of judicial
dissents per se that is a threat to civility, but the unvarnished manner in which dissents
are expressed). See Seventh Circuit, “Interim Report” and “Final Report.”
37
The same dynamic is evident in contemporary efforts to maintain civility in Congress.
Since 1997, members of Congress have openly worried about declining legislative
civility and attempted to address the problem by commissioning studies, holding
hearings, and convening bipartisan retreats. Observers have linked the decline to a shift
in political commitments away from specific government institutions and toward personal
re-election efforts and perpetual campaigning. Congress has grown less civil, in other
words, because members of Congress increasingly practice a different kind of politics.
See “Civility in the House of Representatives – Transcript,” April 17, 1997 and May 1,
1997.” United State House of Representatives Website. Visited February 18, 2005.
<http://www.house.gov/rules> Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Civility in the House of
Representatives – Executive Summary, March 1997.” United State House of
Representatives Website. Visited February 18, 2005.
<http://www.house.gov/rules/jami01.htm> Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Erika Falk,
“Civility in the House of Representatives: An Update.”; “Civility in the House of
Representatives: The 105th Congress.”; “Civility in the House of Representatives: The
106th Congress.” Annenberg Public Policy Center Website. Visited February 18, 2005.
<http://www.appcpenn.org/pubs.htm> For additional arguments that link civility to a
particular political order, see Kennedy, “Against Civility” and Virginia Sapiro,
“Considering Political Civility Historically: A Case Study of the United States,”
unpublished conference paper, Annual Meeting of the International Society for Political
Psychology, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 1999.
38
See Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change,” Law and Society Review 9 (1974), pp. 95-160 and the essays collected in
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V. Conclusion
I have argued that the advancement of LGBT rights depends on changing the
standing that non-heterosexuals enjoy as a matter of common courtesy. Based on an
account of how common courtesy works, I have outlined the possibilities and constraints
confronting any effort to alter prevailing manners. In this vein, I have also suggested that
the law may be a useful agent of change: it serves the same purposes (and operates on
the same basis) as courtesy and, thus, may function as an alternative kind of politeness, a
form of “legal courtesy” that offers a way of contesting the claims and hierarchies of
common courtesy. The alternative presented by law is not perfect, for the law has its
own exclusions and inequities. But, unlike courtesy, the law is centrally organized. At
least some parts of the law can be more readily reformed than manners and subsequently
can be used to alter the ways in which social standing is distributed.39
Of course, at this stage in time, it is unclear how much legal reform will actually
occur. In 2004, constitutional amendments barring same-sex marriage were passed in 13
states. More state bans are on the ballot in 2005 and the idea of an anti-same-sex
marriage ban is also being entertained at the federal level. Yet, if the prospect of legal
reform is an open question, the difference that legal reform can make in the social

Herbert M. Kritzer and Susan Silbey, eds., In Litigation: Do The “Haves” Still Come Out
Ahead? (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
39
In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that politeness, as a matter of either common
courtesy or of legal practice, is the only political ideal to which we should aspire.
Politeness has it virtues, but it is by no means a panacea that eliminates all political
pathologies. It is possible, for example, to be both polite and cruel (see Miller, Faking it,
p. 42). If we think that that cruelty is a political vice to be avoided, then we must infuse
our politics with more than politeness. See Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1984).
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standing of non-heterosexuals is not. Stories from the regions in which same-sex
marriage has been permitted suggest that the legal recognition of same-sex relationships
has engendered a new measure social respect even for those couples already accepted by
family and friends.
The story of Roey Thorpe, executive director of Basic Rights Oregon and the
leader of the effort that (briefly) legalized same-sex marriage in Multnomah County, is
illustrative and, in closing, deserves to be quoted at length.40 “I’ll tell you a story,”
Thorpe says. “What you should know is that I am a person who never wanted to get
married. I did when I was a kid, but as an adult, I’ve not wanted to do that. I’ve never
lived with any of my partners until the current one. We’ve been together for three years.
I would not have been the person who proposed marriage in our relationship. But we got
married at our house on the Saturday after the marriages started.”
“My partner invited her whole family, who all live here in Portland, and her
friends. I invited my friends. My most important people are scattered all over the
country, and there was no time for them to be here. Our wedding was very emotional, as
were all of the weddings I observed. Her family has always been so supportive of me.
They have treated me like a member of the family since they met me. They’ve included
me in every way that you could be included. It’s remarkable. Not only are we both
women, but I’m a gay rights activist. That’s not a very easy thing to integrate into your
family. But her family has not batted an eye.”
“[Even so], my partner’s sister came up to me after the wedding and said,
‘Welcome to the family.’ It was a profound moment for me. What I realized was that,
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Thorpe tells her story in Pinello, “Oregon’s Struggle.”
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although I didn’t feel any more like a member of the family than I had before, for her,
that ritual, that wedding was a rite of passage…. I had not even been aware of that
before.”
“I’ll give you another example. Her 85-year-old grandmother was there with her
boyfriend [she giggles]. She’s about as big as a minute. She’s a tiny little lady, all pink
and white. She came to our wedding, and we talked about it afterward. She said, ‘You
know, it was just like every other wedding.’ She was surprised by that. Well, the year
before, I had invited her to come to Basic Rights Oregon’s annual dinner. My partner
and I had bought a table, and we invited her whole family to come. She said, ‘You know,
dear, I just don’t know if I would be comfortable.’ I said, ‘That’s fine. I understand. No
problem.’ But I resolved that I would ask her every year. So this year, in October, after
our wedding, I asked her again. She said, ‘I would love to.’ And I said, ‘So what
changed for you?’ I thought her answer was going to be something like, ‘I came to your
wedding, and I realized that gay people are OK. I got more comfortable.’ Instead, what
she said was, ‘Well, dear, it’s a family thing now.’ So today I’m her granddaughter-inlaw, or whatever you call it. And now for her, it’s something that I’m doing. So she’ll
go, because it’s about family.”
“This is the most profound thing that I learned. It’s also the most profoundly
painful thing, because – I don’t even know if I can say this without crying – it means that
we aren’t family without it, [she does cry as she says] and I don’t think we realize that
until it happens…. That pain is something that we are not in touch with. And we can’t
be. Because in order to live your life, you have to deny that pain. In order to have any
kind of happiness, you can’t think about it all the time. Our movement’s been
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remarkable in helping people deal with that, and helping us think it through, and helping
us believe and support the idea that we can have a ceremony in our church or that we can
have a domestic partnership or we can have something and it doesn’t matter what other
people think because we know what we have. But you know what – it matters.”

27

